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South Korean Presidential Politics Turns Liberal:
Transformative Change or Business as Usual?
J €ORG MICHAEL DOSTAL
Abstract
The impeachment of President Park Gyeun-hye on 10 March 2017 saw South Korean politics
enter a period of crisis. Her removal from ofﬁce, the result of an unprecedented mass move-
ment of citizen protests, provided a springboard for the subsequent success of the liberal
candidate, Moon Jae-in, in the presidential election of 9 May 2017. This article suggests that
political change in South Korea is only possible if actors move beyond the politics of person-
ality, and tackle the structural reasons for the policy failures of recent times. Further, if
democracy, a humane economic system and responsive political institutions are going to be
developed and nourished, the country’s ‘imperial presidency’ needs to be reformed. In par-
ticular, the current ‘winner-takes-all’ politics, with the presidency as the main locus of power,
needs to be reformed in ways that promote a more balanced political system, increasing the
inﬂuence of other actors and institutions.
Keywords: constitutional reform, imperial presidency, Moon Jae-in, Park Gyeun-hye,
presidentialism, South Korea
Introduction
THE UNPRECEDENTED IMPEACHMENT of Park
Gyeun-hye by the South Korean constitu-
tional court on 10 March 2017, and her sub-
sequent arrest on abuse of power and
corruption allegations, constitutes the most
dramatic event in South Korea’s history since
the transition to democracy in the late 1980s.
South Korea’s political system concentrates
power at the very top; removing a President
from ofﬁce leaves an entire ﬂotilla of politi-
cal institutions effectively rudderless. The
presidential elections of 9 May 2017 saw the
victory of the main liberal candidate, Moon
Jae-in of the Democratic Party of Korea, with
41.1 per cent of the votes cast, in a ﬁeld of
ﬁve serious contenders.
This article puts these tumultuous events
into the context of the country’s political cul-
ture and asks a number of fundamental ques-
tions. Does the current political crisis suggest a
transformation of the country’s constitution,
political system and social fabric? Or will it be
remembered as just another clash between
opposing conservative and liberal political
tendencies? In particular, will recent events
precipitate the decline of the current ‘winner-
takes-all’ political system, concentrating power
in the hands of an ‘imperial presidency’ of
South Korea?1 What kind of development is
the country going to face in a world in which
geopolitical tensions between China and the
USA might directly affect its future prospects
—given that South Korea now has more trade
with China than the USA, but remains under a
US security umbrella that is increasingly at
odds with China’s regional aspirations?
The article considers ﬁve key themes: the
collapse of the Park Gyeun-hye presidency;
these developments in the context of South
Korean history and the particularity of the
political system; the impact upon the econ-
omy; the relationship between these events
and the major cleavages in contemporary
society; and, ﬁnally, a brief description of the
presidential election campaign of April and
May 2017, before concluding with likely
future scenarios for South Korea.
The impeachment of President
Park Gyeun-hye
At ﬁrst glance, the downfall of former
President Park might be compared with the
gradual collapse of a building. From the
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appearance of hairline cracks and the dis-
placement of a few bricks to the caving in of
the roof, it is very difﬁcult to calculate when
the rot actually set in. The Park presidency
began with a narrow election win in 2012
against the liberal candidate Moon Jae-in.
She derived her support largely from an
older generation of Koreans, while younger
voters predominantly backed her liberal
opponent. As a presidential candidate in
2012, Park had appeared to move away from
ﬁscal conservatism to the centre ground,
suggesting an expansion of the welfare state
and, in particular, the introduction of a uni-
versal basic pension for senior citizens. How-
ever, this targeted election promise to
mobilise older voters—old-age poverty is
one of the country’s major social problems—
was quickly broken after her election on the
grounds of being too expensive.
In a very short time, the focus and politi-
cal purpose of her presidency became
unclear. There were buzzwords: narratives
about a ‘creative Korea’, seeking to reposi-
tion the country with regard to ‘cultural
industries’, but this aspiration was never
really followed through. Instead, the coun-
try’s cultural life became the object of a con-
servative political onslaught. The presidency
sought to narrow the scope of what was con-
sidered to be of cultural value and worthy of
state support to those loyal to Park’s admin-
istration. In one telling incident, a painting
by artist Hong Sung-dam that presented the
President as the incarnation of her father
(the former long-term South Korean Presi-
dent Park Chung-hee who had ruled the
country as an authoritarian leader between
1961 and 1979) was rejected for the Gwangju
Biennale exhibition. This was a remarkable
affair, given that the city of Gwangju had a
long history of resistance to the military
regime before democratisation in the 1980s,
and has always been a stronghold of liberal-
ism.2 The rejected artist received a mention
of his case on the front page of the New York
Times as a consolation prize, but many
others were less lucky and simply had their
work excluded by state-controlled funding
bodies.3
Similarly, Park advanced the project of
issuing new history text books for
high schools. Written by state-appointed
authors, and in a spirit favoured by some
conservatives, the project was designed to
do justice to the historical achievements of
her father, but it was strongly opposed by
liberals and the overwhelming majority of
teachers. It took two more years for the gen-
eral public to discover that people working
for the Park presidency had actually black-
listed artists, writers, publishers and other
cultural ﬁgures that were regarded as unreli-
able by conservatives who, instead, sup-
ported those considered to be on the side of
the President.4
Conﬂicts over cultural representation
aside, a decisive moment for the Park presi-
dency was the tragic sinking of the ship
Sewol on 16 April 2014. The ship capsized
off the west coast of Korea drowning 304 of
the 476 passengers; among them 246 high
school students from Danwon High School
in Ansan city. The major reason for the high
number of casualties was the failure of the
authorities to organise a prompt rescue oper-
ation, and advice given by crew members
for students to stay in their cabins until fur-
ther notice. The crew subsequently left the
ship, along with the captain, while most of
the teenagers who had followed the advice
of their elders perished in the accident.
Under the South Korean presidential sys-
tem, major emergency responses require the
coordinated effort of the presidential ofﬁce,
chaired by the President. However, Park’s
appearance on the day of the accident was
much delayed. The various public bodies
tasked with coordinating naval rescue
operations were disorganised due to admin-
istrative reforms that had left strategic
responsibility unclear. Hence, much time
was wasted, and no decisive rescue opera-
tion occurred. It also transpired that the cap-
tain and the crew had been casual workers,
employed on short-term contracts, and that
the vessel had been overloaded with cargo,
while ofﬁcial documents had been falsiﬁed
to maximise proﬁts. Whilst some details of
the catastrophe continue to be contested, it is
certainly appropriate to call the event a man-
made disaster.5
After the Sewol incident, relatives and
friends of the victims and their supporters
campaigned to demand a full government
inquiry. The event caused much national
introspection; many recognised from their
own experience that cutting corners, and
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conducting business speedily rather than
safely, was an entrenched part of Korean
everyday life. This was arguably a legacy
from the country’s single-minded focus on
economic development. Under the authori-
tarian regime of the 1960s and 1970s, a
hyper-liberal version of capitalism had given
rise to a culture with little concern for safety
regulations or workers’ protection. As far as
President Park herself was concerned, she
failed to clarify her whereabouts on the day of
the sinking, and the incident created a perma-
nent rift between her and large sections of the
public.
The ‘Park–Choi Gate’
In the autumn of 2016, the visible cracks in
Park’s power base expanded when the rela-
tionship between Park and her long-term
friend and conﬁdante, Choi Soon-sil, came
under public scrutiny after it was revealed
that Choi’s daughter had graduated from the
prestigious Ewha Womans University with-
out fulﬁlling the academic requirements. It
was later revealed that her entire educational
career had progressed on the basis of strong-
arming teaching personnel to pass her as a
‘sport student’.
Choi’s father had, at different times, acted
as a Buddhist monk, shamanistic medium
and evangelical preacher in various cults.
More to the point, he had been tasked by
Park’s father to assist in the education of the
young Park Geun-hye in the 1970s. The cults,
chaired by Choi’s father, had primarily
served to provide ‘spiritual’ support for the
military regime but had, in parallel, collected
money from businesses. Such donations were
‘offered’ by the chaebols (the Korean term for
‘rich clan’), the family-led industrial con-
glomerates in South Korea, which had been
created under the regime of Park’s father to
facilitate industrialisation since the 1960s.
Such donations were in effect kickbacks, rein-
forcing the close relationship between
the military regime and the chaebols in state-
led economic development projects. In short,
the long-standing collaborative relationship
between the two families served to accumu-
late political and economic resources that
were subsequently transferred to the next
generation made up of the two daughters.
The close relationship between Park and
Choi was known to well-informed observers;
yet detail beyond the general existence of
such networks was scarce.6 Thus, the news
that President Park relied on Choi for the
informal management of state business and
had shared conﬁdential state documents
with her despite the fact that Choi had no
security clearance and no ofﬁcial role in the
government, caused an outcry from the pub-
lic. As one observer put it, the news that
Choi Soon-sil [acted]
as the eminence grise . . . having access to and
meddling with conﬁdential government doc-
uments such as Presidential Records before
they were publicised, intervening in the
appointment of core governmental posts,
inﬂuencing policy decisions, and pursuing
private interests including the establishment
of two foundations with about 80 billion
won ($68 million) extorted from chaebol, large
domestic conglomerates . . . [p]oint to Park
herself being responsible for the scandalous
incidents and Choi reigning as a shadow
President.
The same author suggested that:
[i]t is simultaneously bewildering and trou-
bling to accept such an irrational reality
where events that were once confounding
are miraculously solved once we put the
newly discovered puzzle-piece of Choi Soon-
sil into place . . . As such, any rational
approach to understanding Park and her
administration could have only been frus-
trated, naturally dispiriting citizens and
experts in their attempts to understand
the Park administration’s major policy
decisions.7
The most signiﬁcant development, beside the
permanent stream of revelations about how
Choi had inﬂuenced Park in terms of editing
her speeches, collecting ‘donations’ for two
sports foundations from chaebols and giving
orders on behalf of the President to high-
ranking government ofﬁcials, was the emer-
gence of a weekly street protest demanding
the immediate resignation of Park from
ofﬁce. The street rallies took place on week-
ends between November 2016 and March
2017, close to the presidential palace, and
were mirrored by similar large rallies in
provincial cities all over the country. They
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were attended by hundreds of thousands of
citizens making a single political demand:
Park’s immediate resignation from ofﬁce.
These ‘candlelight rallies’ were always peace-
ful and virtually ﬁlled the entire city centre
with protestors. Conservative sympathisers
directly associated with Park engaged in
counter rallies in front of the major railway
station of Seoul. However, these rallies were
small and almost exclusively comprised
older people with an evangelical back-
ground. The difference in crowd sizes
echoed her approval ratings, which fell to a
record low of below ﬁve per cent.
The decision to impeach Park was taken
by the Korean parliament on 8 December
2016, with 234 out of 300 parliamentarians
supporting it in a secret ballot. This meant
that around half of the conservative faction
and the entire opposition bloc had voted in
favour of her impeachment. The decision
was unanimously upheld by the constitu-
tional court on 10 March 2017 and Park
thereby lost her immunity from prosecution.
She was subsequently arrested and is cur-
rently jailed.
Main features of South Korean
politics
To place the impeachment of Park in its
broader analytical context, what follows is a
brief description of the basic features of South
Korean politics. The division of Korea in 1945
gave birth to the ﬁrst Republic under the
authoritarian leadership of Rhee Syung-man
—a regime which lasted from 1948 until 1960.
Conservatives highlight the year 1948 as the
‘foundation of independent Korea’. In con-
trast, liberals emphasise the Korean provi-
sional government of 1919, exiled during
Japanese colonial rule in Korea (1910–45), as
the foundation of modern Korean politics.
The current democratic state (since 1987) is
referred to as the sixth Republic. With the
exception of the short-lived second Republic
between 1960 and 1961, which had a parlia-
mentary system until the military coup of Park
Chung-hee, all previous ‘republics’ have had
authoritarian presidential systems. The third,
fourth and ﬁfth Republics were more or less
directly controlled by the military.
The transition to democracy in 1987 was
based upon a settlement between the old
regime and moderate opposition leaders.
The compromise left substantial elements of
an authoritarian political system, in particu-
lar the dominance of the presidency,
untouched. The main substantive change
was for the President to be directly elected
under a single-round, ﬁrst past the post
electoral system, for a non-renewable term
of ﬁve years. During the ﬁrst democratic
presidential election in 1987, liberal votes
were split between two competing candi-
dates, which allowed the conservative can-
didate to win with only thirty-six per cent
of the votes cast. This defeat meant that the
expected democratisation of institutions
remained limited in scope. South Korea’s
political economy, based upon low taxes,
low regulation, and limited levels of redis-
tributive and welfare policies, remained in
place.8
The current system is referred to as an
‘imperial presidency’, which is due to the
lack of an effective division of powers
between the President and the other politi-
cal actors and institutions. At present, the
presidency controls domestic and foreign
policy-making in an ‘imperial’ manner. In
particular, the constitution of the sixth
Republic gives the President the power to
appoint the prime minister, the cabinet
members, the chief justice of the constitu-
tional court and the head of the board of
audit. Despite the fact that these appoint-
ments are subject to parliamentary hear-
ings, and that they require the consent of
a majority in parliament (the National
Assembly), the powers of the parliamen-
tary branch are fairly weak. The President
can veto legislative bills originating in par-
liament, and can directly propose legisla-
tion to parliament. The presidential veto
can only be overcome by a two-thirds
majority in parliament, which is unlikely
given the country’s electoral and party
system, which reﬂects a rough balance in
representation between conservatives and
liberals.9 Moreover, the main focus of par-
liamentary work is the approval of the
annual budget, drafted by an executive led
by the President. There is perhaps no
other democratic country in the world in
which the constitutional position of the
President is as overwhelmingly strong as
South Korea’s.
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In political science scholarship, the South
Korean case has received limited attention.
To the extent that one might identify a single
‘classic’ English-language account of Korean
politics, it is perhaps Gregory Henderson’s
Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. Henderson’s
basic argument is that Korea’s history of iso-
lation from the outside world, and its ethnic
homogeneity under a highly centralised
monarchical regime based in Seoul, has pro-
duced a tendency to personalistic rule and
an underdevelopment of intermediate insti-
tutions between the state and the people.
The term ‘vortex’ here stands for a whirlpool
pulling people toward the country’s national
capital, the single political power centre, and
towards the direct contestation for political
power, with little concern for formal rules.
According to Henderson
[i]ndividuals rely on patrons, chance, per-
sonal appearance, family, and, in recent time
education to bring them success, but not on
organization. This tendency has long inhib-
ited the formation of true political parties,
and such groupings as have existed have
been temporary associations of individuals,
whose desire for personal power has far out-
weighed any wish for group continuity.10
However, this perspective does not do full
justice to the complex reality—the decisive
feature is personalistic rule in the context of
strong hierarchical bodies that, in turn, are
based on collectivism. Nonetheless, many
observers would still agree that the state-
ment presents a leitmotif for the country’s
current-day political culture.
The general underdevelopment of formal
institutions still holds true, but it has variant
complementary dimensions. Apart from the
basic absence of institutional continuity,
symbolised for instance by frequent splits
and renaming of political parties (the main-
stream conservatives have changed their
party name ﬁve times since 1987, ignoring
the various splinter groups that have joined
and left), membership of intermediate politi-
cal organisations is low. Low membership
ﬁgures in political parties, trade unions and
pressure groups result in less institutional
complexity and a narrow scope of political
activity for such bodies. For example,
employer associations mostly focus upon the
interests of the chaebols at the expense of
small and medium sized enterprises, whilst,
to the extent that they exist at all, trade
unions mostly cover large enterprises and
the public sector. In some respects, unions at
the individual enterprise level resemble
guilds, and they have on occasion demanded
that current workers be allowed to bequeath
their jobs to their children.
With regard to civil society, the most suc-
cessful bodies have largely been religious
groups—in particular, evangelical churches,
in addition to the more long-standing Bud-
dhist orders and the Catholic Church. Reli-
gious bodies might be expected to act as
intermediaries between the state and civil
society; yet South Korea does not grant a
privileged role to any particular religion, and
around half of the population do not sub-
scribe to any religion. One might suggest
that the public sphere of a highly connected
society is located online. However, beyond
the posting of online messages, the universal
distribution of smart phones does not make
up for the lack of citizen engagement in
organised political activity.
South Korea’s economy today
South Korea’s emergence as a major economic
power relates, ﬁrst, to geopolitics and, second,
to the existence of authoritarian developmen-
talism under the military regime of Park
Chung-hee (1961–79), which drove the coun-
try towards export-led development. During
that period, the USA had a major geopolitical
interest in stabilising the South Korean state.
In this context, Japan served as a role model
for how to develop industrial conglomerates
for export-oriented growth policies. As in
Japan, the USA opened its domestic market
for products from South Korea without
demanding reciprocity in trade and invest-
ment. Both the Japanese and the South Korean
states nurtured the corporations over long
periods of time before they became competi-
tive in world markets. The consequence in
both cases was that business groups, namely
the keiretsus in Japan, deﬁned as corporate
groups of banks, insurance companies and
manufacturing, and the South Korean chae-
bols, shared many structural features and
went on to enjoy near-monopoly power in
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their respective home markets. Moreover,
technology transfer from the US, Japan and
elsewhere allowed South Korea to catch up
and provided the necessary foundations for
economic growth.
The Park regime initially focussed on
developing light industries followed by the
Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) pro-
gramme in the early 1970s. This second stage
policy, the most important period in the
country’s economic history, saw direct state
control of the ﬁnancial sector, and targeted
credit provision for chaebols in exchange for
their ability to meet export targets set by
state ofﬁcials. These policies have usually
been described as the South Korean version
of a developmental state; a concept initially
developed to analyse the political economy
of Japan. Similar to Japan, South Korea’s
chaebols became leading producers in sectors
such as car manufacturing, ship building,
steel, chemicals and electronics.
While Japanese capitalism had developed
organically since the late nineteenth century,
in South Korea the state replaced the agency
of an initially underdeveloped capitalist class.
South Korea thus represented a limited ver-
sion of developmentalism: until the late 1980s
the country was not a liberal democracy,
while Japan had become one (albeit by
default) after the end of World War II. Fur-
thermore, the lifelong employment system
that had been a main feature of the Japanese
keiretsu system and the emphasis on com-
pany-based welfare policies was much less
common in South Korea. Overall, South
Korea remained considerably more market-
liberal, at least with regard to welfare and reg-
ulatory efforts, and when compared to the
earlier Japanese model. Thus, extreme eco-
nomic liberalism was complemented by a
strong, but highly selective state that focussed
mainly on providing guidance to the chaebols
and on maintaining national security in the
face of its hostile neighbour, North Korea.
Overall, South Korea’s developmental
state model provided for a long period of
rapid economic growth. Real GDP grew by
9.5 per cent between 1961 and 1970, 9.3
percent between 1981 and 1990, seven per
cent between 1991 and 2000, 4.4 per cent
between 2001 and 2010, and around three
per cent from 2011 to 2016.11 The one major
economic downturn occurred during the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–98 when the
proﬁtability of the chaebols could no longer
be patched up by state lending. The crisis
resulted in the large-scale downsizing of
chaebol employment and the subsequent
expansion of the informal employment sec-
tor. In the 2000s, South Korea made a rapid
comeback on the growth wave of new com-
munication technologies (smart phones and
other ‘smart’ IT products). Although such
technology had largely been developed out-
side the country, the system of close collabo-
ration between state and chaebols allowed for
‘quick followership’, and thus demonstrated
the continued relevance of some aspects of
the developmental state with the ‘bench-
marking’ of foreign products for export-
oriented production.
In the twenty-ﬁrst century, the chaebols have
become signiﬁcant global players, increasing
investment worldwide, and outsourcing
labour-intensive manufacturing to China and
to transition countries in south Asia, such as
Vietnam and Indonesia. To some extent, the
solid growth rates of South Korea in the 2000s
were related to the initial industrial invest-
ments undertaken in China. The technology
component of Chinese products took off and
provided competition for some South Korean
products. The relationship between the chae-
bols and the South Korean state has become
more complicated, and there is an ongoing
debate about the future role of the chaebol–state
nexus and the relevancy of the developmental
state under current conditions.
The major challenge for South Korean capi-
talism remains one of how to make the econ-
omy more innovative in order to capture
future growth sectors. In this context, the
country has taken some steps in the right
direction; its spending on research and devel-
opment is now at levels twice as high as Euro-
pean Union countries.12 Yet, it remains to be
seen if spending alone will help to deliver
innovation in the context of highly hierarchical
institutions that might not be able to take full
advantage of such efforts.
Main cleavages of contemporary
South Korea
If South Korea is to succeed in the future,
policy-makers must provide innovative
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policy responses that appeal to the main
socio-political actors in contemporary soci-
ety. The major conﬂict lines that intersect in
complex and nuanced ways are: (i) social
class; (ii) regionalism; (iii) ideology; (iv) gen-
erational and gender conﬂicts; and (v), the
competing norms which derive from Confu-
cianism, capitalism, constitutionalism and
democratic values, the coexistence of which
inevitably produces complex political ten-
sions.
The ﬁrst major cleavage in South Korea
derives from social class conﬂict. Most South
Koreans tend to imagine their society as
being predominantly middle class. A high
value is placed on competitive individualism
and an achievement-orientated mind-set. In
this context, social class and social position
are expected to be based on ‘merit’—mea-
sured by educational attainment and by the
ability to pass highly competitive entrance
exams that regulate access to desirable
employment in the public and private sec-
tors. Such exams require lengthy and often
several years’ individual study time in order
for applicants to have any realistic chance of
passing them. The most desirable ﬁelds of
employment, ﬁlled mostly by these annual
competitive exams, are: (i) elite public ser-
vant jobs in the central government bureau-
cracy that usually offer lifelong tenure; (ii)
chaebol employment that offers a higher
degree of employment security than other
jobs, higher wages and a career structure;
and (iii) other professional and public sector
jobs with a certain degree of employment
security. All other kinds of employment are
considered less desirable; there is no tradi-
tion of valuing vocational skills or small and
medium enterprises.
However, there is a tangible lack of ﬁt
between the self-image of a middle-class
society and concrete social realities. While
there exists some foundation for social
change and upward social mobility—for
example the expansion of tertiary education
in which around seventy per cent of young
people between twenty-ﬁve and thirty-four
have graduated with a degree—educational
expansion has not been matched by available
positions in the labour market. The South
Korean labour market suffers from extreme
dualism between formal and informal
employment. All desirable positions are in
short supply: public sector employment
(general government and public corporations
included) represents only 7.6 per cent of total
employment, against 21.3 per cent across the
OECD countries, according to the most
recent ﬁgures. Moreover, the number of elite
civil servants working in the central public
administration and enjoying near universal
employment tenure is only 156,000.13
In the private sector, the numerical signiﬁ-
cance of chaebol employment is also limited.
Only around ten per cent of Koreans work
directly for such conglomerates, and the rela-
tive quality of their employment experience
is mixed, with the largest corporations such
as Samsung and Hyundai considered more
desirable than their lesser-known competi-
tors. While these conglomerates usually offer
a career structure, their employment system
is highly competitive with an ‘up-or-out’
work regime, that is, mid-level employees
are expected to either gain promotion or face
the prospect of ‘voluntary’ retirement. As a
result, chaebol careers are highly demanding
and often cut short, with employees in their
forties and ﬁfties commonly ‘retiring’ from
their positions, often without any clear second
career option.
The remainder of the economy consists of
non-regular and informal employment, such
as self-employment, temporary employment,
and work in small and medium enterprises
that focus on services and niche production
not (yet) controlled by the chaebols. Most of
these workplaces offer low wages, long
hours and no career structure. In addition,
all past legislative efforts to provide a bridge
between temporary employment and perma-
nent employment—the former is very com-
mon in all employment sectors, including
the public sector and the chaebols—have
failed to be effective: employers continue to
focus on temporary job expansion to avoid
facing long-term obligations toward their
employees. In sum, there exists a large gap
between labour market insiders and out-
siders: only the former can be said to belong
to the middle-class minority.
The second conﬂict line in South Korea
concerns regionalism. At ﬁrst glance, South
Korea is an unlikely case of political region-
alism. The entire country is highly urbanized
and nearly half of the population lives in the
capital Seoul and its satellite towns. In
486 J €OR G M I C H A E L DO S T A L
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 3 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017
addition, the capital city historically grew
because of migration from all other parts of
the country. Despite this, South Korean poli-
tics is strongly inﬂuenced by regional voting
cleavages. Support for liberal candidates is
aligned with the south west, whilst the south
eastern parts of the country are a stronghold
of the conservatives (this is referred to as the
‘Honam versus Yeongnam’ gap in electoral
support). In terms of regional voting pat-
terns, support for liberals or conservatives
can be as high as ninety per cent in each of
these two particular regions, while voting
patterns in other parts of the country are
more genuinely competitive.14
The third main division in South Korean
politics is the ideological conﬂict between
conservatism and liberalism. This conﬂict
intersects with the social and economic
cleavages already discussed. Political parties
in South Korea are underdeveloped in the
sense that there exists no mass membership
or ideological coherence of the kind associ-
ated with traditional left versus right party
identities. Instead, conservatist and liberal
parties consist of factions (some of them with
a regionalist component, others based on
personal loyalties), splits and fusions are fre-
quent, as is the renaming of political parties
in addition to occasional travel between the
conservative and liberal factions.
From a conservative point of view,
national security, the close collaboration
with the USA and economic growth trump
all other political considerations. The con-
servatives historically constructed the South
Korean state as designed primarily to serve
the chaebols. The state was ‘strong’ in terms
of intervening in the economy, repressing
the labour movement, and blurring the line
between domestic issues and national secu-
rity by declaring political resistance of any
kind to be in the service of North Korea.
At the same time, the conservative state
was ‘weak’ in its attachment to economic
hyper-liberalism—by avoiding efforts to
reach out to organised labour, or to pro-
vide a developed welfare state. The legacy
of this particular brand of authoritarian
conservatism has been a level of social
spending that is at the bottom end of the
OECD world, and far below of what one
would expect of a country with South
Korea’s advanced level of economic
development. For conservatives, a strong
state combined with a laissez-faire attitude
to welfare and social policies is still a per-
fectly acceptable policy package.
In contrast, South Korean liberals have
historically preferred a more consensual
approach to economic policy, and in the late
1980s and 1990s, in favour of efforts
to develop institutionalised collaboration
between the state, capital and labour by way
of neo-corporatist bodies. They also favoured
the development of a more comprehensive
welfare state and, more recently, have
stressed the need to improve the position of
women in the workplace. In terms of
national security, the liberals have focussed
on efforts to strengthen intra-Korean cooper-
ation, especially during the ‘sunshine policy’
years of two liberal presidencies between
1998 and 2008, where efforts to expand eco-
nomic cooperation between the North and
the South occurred. In addition, most liberals
have retained some critical distance from
US policy-making in the region, stressing
instead the signiﬁcance of multilateral efforts
to reach out to China and Russia.
The fourth cleavage of generational and
gender differences was illustrated in the
2017 presidential election—and other recent
elections—which saw the development of an
age gap between younger voters under the
age of forty preferring liberals, and a more
conservative older generation. One of the
reasons for this generational difference in
political attitudes is increased education.
Higher educational attainment strongly cor-
relates with a stronger focus on quality of
life issues, while the single-minded pursuit
of economic growth is still favoured by some
of the older generation. In addition, the
absence of a developed welfare state over-
burdens the younger generation, who are
pressured to take care of and support elderly
parents with limited access to old-age pen-
sions.
At the same time, young families also
have to bear childcare and private education
costs in order to support their offspring in
the highly competitive environment of the
‘educational arms race’: a situation which
has produced the lowest fertility rates in
OECD countries. These problems have a
signiﬁcant gender dimension. In particular,
having children might still result in the
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expectation on the part of employers for
women to ‘voluntarily’ resign from their
employment, potentially terminating their
careers. Moreover, men and women suffer
from an ofﬁce culture that encourages long
hours and presenteeism rather than work–
life balance. This, in turn, does not allow any
free time for family life during weekdays.
The ﬁfth cleavage relates to clashes over
norms and values in contemporary society.
In particular, there are major contradictions
between traditional Confucian and more
recent capitalistic and constitutional val-
ues. The Confucian value system stresses
the need for individuals to practise self-
cultivation and high ethical standards. From
a Confucian point of view, the selection of
ethically sound individuals will result in
good governance. Selecting the right individ-
uals for the right role will improve society
and make a rigid hierarchical order just, on
the grounds that competent leadership
derives its authority from its inherent qual-
ity. This ethic naturally clashes with the val-
ues of capitalism that are mostly limited to
the proﬁt motive and the cash nexus. In a
hyper-liberal capitalist system, such as the
one prevalent in South Korea, economic suc-
cess must be achieved at almost any cost,
leaving little space for an ethic of social
responsibility. In more regulated versions of
capitalism, such a lack of ethical considera-
tions might be constrained by constitutional
provisions, where individuals have recourse
for addressing conﬂicts in the workplace or
to arbitrate over conﬂicts between compa-
nies, the state and civil society.
In South Korea, these conﬂicting value
systems coexist in social and political institu-
tions, and are in a permanent state of ﬂux;
each of the three normative orientations have
moments of dominance. This context of com-
peting value systems makes for weak formal
institutions and, simultaneously, inserts the
highly personalised culture of leadership
and/or management into South Korea’s
organisations and workplaces. As a result,
rules and regulations frequently exist on
paper only and can often be overruled by
the highest-ranking person. In the same con-
text, leaders will usually bring their own
agendas to institutions: seemingly ‘great’
projects appear out of nowhere, only to dis-
appear again once the leadership changes—
and leadership must frequently change
hands in order to check the extreme power
concentration at the very top.
Political and economic projects can thus be
advanced quickly; there is rarely a need to
consult with organised interests, who are
either absent or powerless. At the same time,
high-speed decision-making also reﬂects the
non-existence of any long-term strategy and
of organisational coherence—which, in turn,
clashes with normative considerations pre-
sent in the Confucian ethical system. In sum-
mary, South Korean institutions do not
follow Max Weber’s ideal of rational bureau-
cracy, but subscribe to a ﬂuctuating set of
conﬂicting norms and values. To a large
extent, this explains why transformative
change has proved to be so elusive.
The presidential election of 2017
This year’s presidential election was marked
by the emergence of a clear frontrunner in
the liberal candidate Moon Jae-in of the
Democratic Party of Korea, and the corre-
sponding electoral decline of the conserva-
tives. Moon enjoyed a comfortable election
victory with 41.1 per cent of the votes cast.
The mainstream conservative candidate
Hong Joon-pyo of the recently founded Lib-
erty Korea Party (the renamed supporters of
former President Park’s party) received
twenty-four per cent, and the centrist Ahn
Cheol-soo of the People’s Party—which had
until recently been a faction within the
Democratic Party—achieved 21.4 per cent.
There were also two minor candidates of
right and left who secured 6.8 and 6.2 per
cent, respectively. Hitherto, splits amongst
the liberal camp would have ensured victory
for the conservative candidate in the single-
round presidential election. This time
around, the combined centrist, liberal and
leftist vote amounted to a two-thirds major-
ity of the votes cast, which is unprecedented
in South Korea’s electoral history.
During the election campaign, the con-
tested issues were many. The main domestic
topics concerned the need to reform the rela-
tionship between the state and the chaebols,
issues of unemployment and underemploy-
ment, demographic decline, and quality of
life issues such as the problem of heavy air
pollution. In addition, the candidates all
488 J €OR G M I C H A E L DO S T A L
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 3 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017
commented on the need for constitutional
reforms to replace the ‘imperial presidency’
with a system which devolved some presi-
dential powers to other political actors, such
as the prime minister or parliament. How-
ever, a precondition for successful constitu-
tional reform would be collaboration by the
political parties in order to achieve the neces-
sary qualiﬁed majority in parliament. The
deep-seated political factionalism, and the
absence of a tradition of coalition govern-
ment, make meaningful change hard to
foresee.
The major development during the elec-
tion campaign was the surprise move by the
USA to install an anti-missile defence system
in South Korea. The installation of the Termi-
nal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
was the response of the Trump administra-
tion to the recent rocket testing of the North.
The manner in which the THAAD system
was delivered to South Korea, on 25 April
2017, can only be described as US unilateral-
ism: it remained unclear as to what consulta-
tion of South Korean politicians had taken
place, given that the Park impeachment had
created a vacuum in government. On the
campaign trail, Moon had stressed that the
deployment of THAAD should not be
rushed ahead of the presidential elections. In
fact, delivery occurred just days before the
election and was immediately followed by
Trump’s suggestion that the issue of who
should cover the THAAD expenses would
have to be re-negotiated with the view of
making South Korea pay more.
In this context, a potentially signiﬁcant
development was that opinion polls pointed
to a clear majority of South Koreans favour-
ing efforts to restore a more dialogue-based
relationship with the North, rather than a
further tightening of sanctions. Whilst the
results of such opinion polls depended
strongly on how the question was phrased,
it was nevertheless signiﬁcant that a two-
thirds overall majority, including a signiﬁ-
cant share of conservatives, do support intra-
Korean dialogue in some way or other.15
When on the campaign trail, the new Presi-
dent Moon handled the issue well: conserva-
tive allegations about him being ‘soft’ on
national security had little effect on voters.
Moon’s election will be an interesting test
case for the future of South Korean foreign
and security policy: how far will Moon be
able to assert himself when faced with
Trump and his team, on the one hand, and
China and Russia on the other?
Conclusion
This article posed the question of whether
the impeachment of former conservative
President Park and the election of the new
liberal President Moon points to transforma-
tive change in South Korean politics and
society. Will the current political climate
allow for the recalibration of South Korean
democracy thirty years after the last constitu-
tional revision during the transition to
democracy in 1987? How is the country
going to overcome the conﬂict between the
rising expectations of a sophisticated citi-
zenry, and the limited ability of the political
institutions to deliver substantial improve-
ments with regard to economic and quality
of life issues? Can the deep-seated structural
problems in the economy, workplace and
gender inequalities, demographic decline
and environmental problems be resolved?
The trigger for comprehensive political
reform can, in principle, emerge from dif-
ferent directions, such as in the form of a
‘big bang’ scheme, incremental adaptation
or reform by accident. The current political
leadership in South Korea was in part
delivered from each of these potential trig-
gers. The street rallies that removed Presi-
dent Park from power were a decisive
‘accidental’ ingredient that forced the old
administration out and created a climate in
which the liberals, for the ﬁrst time, man-
aged to capture a two-thirds majority of
electoral support.
Improving democracy, and delivering
structural change, demands large-scale con-
stitutional engineering. This would mean
ﬁnding common ground between construc-
tive liberals and conservatives to change the
1987 Constitution—the rule book of the
country’s political system—which currently
provides for the ‘winner-takes-all’ logic of
the country’s ‘imperial presidency’. The Con-
stitution itself ensures that any incoming
President loses interest in constitutional
change the moment they enter the presiden-
tial palace. Since a President is, from that
point on, removed from the rest of the
S O U T H KO R E A N P R E S I D E N T I A L P O L I T I C S T U R N S L I B E R A L 489
© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 3
political system, they primarily focus on
what could be accomplished in the short
window of time provided by the single ﬁve-
year presidential term.16 Thus, the presiden-
tial incentive has always been to concentrate
on the issues at hand rather than to think
about the future. Yet the emergence of a
two-party liberal axis with two different
leadership personalities (Moon and Ahn)
could potentially deliver a broader coalition
for change.
The current ‘imperial presidency’ in South
Korea is intimately linked to the underdevel-
opment of party politics, and the weakness
of parliament. This, in turn, relates to the
predominantly ﬁrst past the post electoral
system, producing leader-focussed catch-all
parties, rather than more complex demo-
cratic deliberation and coalition government.
In sum, serious constitutional engineering
would have to encompass all of the major
political institutions in order to deliver
meaningful changes. The current situation
provides a unique opportunity that did not
exist before President Moon’s election.
Last, constitutional change would only be
one starting point amongst others. There are
certainly many other serious problems—the
future of the country’s economic strategy,
national security in a multipolar world and
issues having to do with the social quality of
citizens’ life—that all need to be tackled
urgently. After all, another export-oriented
country in demographic decline next door
has not yet found the way out from what
used to be referred to as the developmental
state, but might now have to be referenced
as the state of stagnation. Now is the time to
seize the moment.
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